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BAiLzLs--AssoLuTn LIALiTY
IN CoNVERsION voR MisDEivERY.--A person who through no act
BAJLMENTS-INVOLUNTARY

or fault of his own has been put in the actual or constructive
possession of a chattel is termed by some cases an involuntary
bailee. He has various rights and liabilities. He is entitled to
collect storage charges, but is not entitled to a lien on the goods,'
except apparently where the owner upon notification fails to re'Heugh v. London & N. W. 1R.Co., (x87o)L. R. 5 Ex. 51, 57, 39 ..J.
Ex. 48, a L .T. 676; Preston v. Neale, (z858) 12 Gray (Mass.) m, =3;
Cowen v. Pressprich, (gn) 192 N. Y. S. 2p, 244. Walker v. Norfolk
& W. R Co., (ipso) 67 W. Va. 273, 277, 67 S. F 70, would apparently
limit the use of the expression to situations wherein goods are thrown on
anothers land by inevitable casualty, winds, storms, etc.
'Preston'v. Neale (1858) 12 Gray (Mass.) a.
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move them.' He can be charged with a duty towards the goods
only when it appears that he knows they are in his possession,
actual or constructive: And even where he has this knowledge, it
was stated in a recent case' that lie has not the slightest duty to care
for them as long as his lack of volition towards them continues. It
is submitted that this latter qualification deprives the subject of involuntary bailments of all novelty, and renders the so-called involuntary bailee liable for misdelivery according to the law of conversion.
A person upon discovering that he is possessed of another's
property may pursue one of three courses: first, he may leave the
goods alone, in which event no liability can be imposed on him for
his non-feasance;' secondly, he may rid himself of the possession ;'
or, thirdly, he may voluntarily assume to care for the chattel by
the exercise of dominion not inconsistent with the rights of the
owner, and having done so, he is bound to use a slight degree of
care.' The policy of the law is against imposing upon a stranger
the duty to care for another's property, but on the other hand, the
law seeks to protect by the doctrine of conversion the owner's interest in such property. The law of conversion creates an abiolute liability where by a positive act, one who has no authority so
to act deprives an owner, or the person entitled to possession, of
title or possession. The controlling element is the owner's loss, and
not the motive of the actor. The only intent necessary is the intent
which the law implies from the act." The soundness of this unqualified doctrine was put to a severe test in the recent case of Co,'Schneider v. Dayton, (1897) 111 Mich. 396, 69 N. W. 829
'Cosentino v. Dominion Exp. Co., (x9o6) i6.Manitoba L. R.563; see
also, Copelin v. Berlin Dye, etc., Co., (194) 168 Cal. 715, 144 Pac. 96 L.
R.A. 1915C 712, z2 N. C.C.A. 362, and Cohen v. Koster, (igo9) u8 N.

Y. S. 142.

'Cowen v.Pressprih, (:g2a) 192 N. Y. S.242.
'The courts usually treat liability for mixdellvery as a liability peculiar
to the law of bailments; whereas in fact it is hut an application of the law
of conversion. Furthermore, the term "involuntary bailee" is misleading
in that the word "bailee" presupposes a duty of some kind, which is contrary to the actual facts. Ithe term "depositary" were 'ised instead of
that of "involuntary bailee," *.here would be less probability of the c:ror
of fixing liability for msdelivery according to the law of bailments.
72o R.C. L. 8; Beal, Bailments, Canad. Ed., 0-08; but see Schoider,

Bailments and Carriers, 3rd Ed., 5-6. As to the right of the owner to re-

take his property from another's premises, sce 22 Col. L. Rev. 354.
' Pt C.L 9So
;RsBwers,C.Conversion,
s . n 2-4;
- t Street, Foundations of Legal Liah-lity,

NOTES

en v, Pressprich." In this case the plaintiff had Agreed to sell and
deliver a negotiable bond to the defendant. To effect a delivery, the
plaintiff's private messenger entered a small anteroom used by such
.messengers, and thrust tile bond with the sales memorandum attached through a slot used for that purpose, the bond falling on a
clerk's desk. It was immediately noticed that the wrong bond
had been delivered; so it was redelivered almost instantly to a person in the anteroom who answered when the plaintiff's name was
called. It turned out that this person was'an impostor; whereupon the plaintiff brought suit for the value of the bond. The
court held that the defendant upon receiving the wrong bond became an involuntary bailee thereof; and that having exercised
dominion over it by the attempted redelivery, he incurred absolute
liability for misdelivery. The decision is apparently correct. It is
submitted, however, that the foundation of the defendant's liability
for his misdelivery" is based on the law of conversion, and not on,
any rule peculiar to the bailor-bailee relationship. , This liability.
being a well defined one, the problem is to find if possible an escape
from it.
Neither the decisions nor the texts suggest a theory of escape
from liability for conversion, except that Bowers says that good
intention will excuse where there is but a slight interference with
the owner's interest:' as where in the owner's presence horses are
put off a ferry and left on the bank with but the intent to eject
them from the ferry." This theoretical suggestion is obviously of
no assistance where the act is one which deprives the owner of a
substantial interest such as possession or title. . Schouler's statement that misdelivery cunningly induced does not subject one to
liability in conversion is not sustained by the authorities he-cites."
At page 252 the dissenting justice con1(192s) 392 N. Y. S. 24a.
'fuses intent with motive.
"The difficulty felt in n Col. L. Rev. 354, 357, in finding a basis for
liability for misdelivery, is not apparent.
"Bowers, Conversion, 4. Another writer classifies the same cases cited
by Bowers as cases wherein the defendant's act dd not of itself sufficiently designate the intent essential to conversion, and that therefore resort
to the actual intent of the individual was justified. z Street, Foundations
of Legal Liability, 235.
"Fouldes v, Willoughby, (a84) 8 Mees. & NV. 540, i Dowl (N.S.)
86,o L. J. Ex. 364. 5 Jur. 534.
'Schouler, Bailments and Carriers, 3rd Ed., 72, citing Metzger v,
Franklin Bank, (1880) zi9 Ind. 359, 21 N. E. 973, wherein the court only
found that the complaint did not state a cause of action based on fraud,
negligence, or breach of contract, and Brant v, McMahon, (1885) 56
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In Hough v. London & N. W. R. Co.,4 and Krumsky v.Looser,"
the doctrine of conversion is evaded, for the courts in both of the
cases treated the subject of misdefivery as a doctrine peculiar to
bailments and foreign to the ordinary rules of conversion. t
It may be doubted that a court would hold that in a situation
such as that presented by the Cowen case, the defendant would
have an absolute right to rid himself of possession of the negotiable
bond, or even further that he would have the right to leave it entirely alone and take no steps for its protection. Undoubtedly the
court would take advantage of any element of invitation or custom between the parties, and it might possibly go further and
recognize that "common courtesy and prudence, if not the law"'
demand that the depositary take steps to enable the owner to recover the property. As a practical matter it would seem inconsistent that a depositary should have the right to rid himself of the
possession of the property and yet be deprived of the right to do
so by delivery to a person whom he reasonably believes to be the
owner. It is submitted, however, that the rights of a depositary
are ample to prevent the encumbrance of his premises with the
goods of another and to prevent the imposition of any duties upon
him with respect thereto, and that in the interest of the owner the
doctrine of conversion should remain unimpaired.
STAGE oF PROCsouRE AT wHIcH

CONSTITUTIONAL

RIGHTS

MUST BE AssnTjc.--The frequency with which constitutional
issues are for the first time raised on appeal or in the late stages
of a trial indicates a wide-spread belief that a constitutional right is
so fundamental that it may be asserted at any time. But an individual may waive a constitutional provision for his benefit when no
Mich. 489, where the court, though considering the case as one of misdelivery, misconceived theeffect of a prior transaction in which by the

law of sales the plaintiff did not acquire title or the right of possession as
against the defendant.

,,I 8l7o) L R. 5 Ex. 51, 39 L J. Ex. 48,21 L T. 676.

1902oz 75 N. Y. S. 1o12.
"The court in the Heugh case, at page 57, finds authority for its holding in that Duff v. Budd, (182) 3 Brod. & B. 177, 6 Moore 469, and Stephenson v. Hart, (18a8) 4 Bing.476, x Moore & P. 357, did not find a common carrier liable in conversion for misdelivery. The cases mentioned
were however actions on the case for negligence; so it is difficult to understand their weight in a question of conversion not in issue under such a
form of action.
"See Cowen v. Pressprich, (zgxa) j9a N. Y. S. 242, 25a; 3 R. C. L.

83.

NOTES

question of public policy or morals is involved,' and a failure to
make an objection questioning the validity of a statute may be

deemed a waiver.' The general rule in civil cases, as stated in
Lohineyer v. St. Louis Cordage Co.; is that a constitutional question should he lodged in the case at the earliest moment that good
pleading and orderly procedure will permit under the
circumstances of the case, otherwise it is waived. Accordingly the
issue should be raised in the pleadings if due to be found there,'
but where the opportunity to invoke a particular constitutional
clause does not arise until the trial is under way, as in objections
to the introduction of evidence or instructions to the jury, the poit
is timely though not presented in the pleadings.' Even where the
whole right of action or defense, in a civil case, is based upon a
statute alleged to be unconstitutional, the general rule is that its
invalidity must be asserted at the earliest opportunity.' In Louisiana, however, a contrary result is reached under the code,' a resuit which Kentucky has reached without special code provision
In a New York case the court said:
"It is the duty of courts to exercise some discretion in determining the time when and the manner in which questions affect-,
ing the constitutional validity of an act of the legislature should be
lresented."
In criminal cases, greater protection is afforded the constitutional rights of a defendant. Where the objection raised is that
the act under which the defendant was indicted is unconstitutional,
'Musco v. United Surely Co.,'(19o9) 196 N. Y.459, 464, go N. E. 171,
A. S. R.8s.
People v.Vaughan, (19t8) 281 Ill. a3, 118 N. 1. 479.
N(1o8) 214 Mo, 68, go 113 S. NV. ano. The object of the rule is
said to be "that the trial court may be treated fairly and the question get
into the case under correct safeguards and ear-marked as of substance and
not mere color." Hartzler v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., (909) 218 Mo.
i34

j02, f,64,117 S. W.

1124.

tiller v.Conuor, (1913) 250 Mo. 677,684, x57 S.W. 8.
'Wabash P. Co. v. Flannigan. (909) 218 Mo. 566, 57o, 117 S. W. 722.
'Lohmneyer v. St. Louis Cordage Co., (1908) 214 Mo. 68, &^g,113 S.
W. isiS
'State v. Winehill & Rosenthal, (19)
347 La. 781, 86 So. 181.
"McCabe's Adnlx. "v.Maysville, etc., P. Co., (a9to) 136 Ky. 674, 6M9g
124 S. W. 892. The court said, "When a cause of action or defense is
based on a statute, it is not necessary that the validity of the statute should
be attacked in a pleading setting forth specifically its invalidity. If the
attention bf the court is directed to the fact that the validity of the statute
is drawn in question, 'and the determination of its validity is necessary to
a correct decision of the case, it will take judicial notice, of the legal question presented.'
In re Woolsey, (1884) 9i N. Y. 13., 144.
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the tendency is to hold that the question is jurisdictional and may
be raised for the first time on appeal." Even after final conviction
on appeal, it has been held that the defendant may attack the
constitutionality of the statute under which he was convicted, in
habeas corpus proeedings for his release from confinement,3 and
one convicted of a crime under an unconstitutional statute, may
attack the statute, after judgment imposing a fine, by motion to

quash the execution issued to collect the fine." In a recent Georgia
case," this doctrine was extended to a quasi-criminal case Where a
physician's license had been revoked, and it was held, after conviction in the court of appeals, that the defendant could bring an
action in equity to prevent the enforcement of the penalties imposed, on the ground that the statute under which he was convicted was unconstitutional. Where, however, the constitutional
question in a criminal case affects only a matter of evidence and
not the jurisdiction of the court, the question must be seasonably
raised in the trial court or it is waived."
A constitutional question cannot be raised for the first time in
the Supreme Court of the United States, on an appeal from a
state court. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is limited tu
points raised and passed upon in the state court."
MINNESOTA'S

WRONGFUL

DEATH

STATUTES-ADVISABIITY

or REMovING DiSPARITIES-LiMITATION oF AcTiow FOR WitONG';
FUN. DETH,-Minnesota has two wrongful death statutes. The

first is section 8175 of the General Statutes of 1913, which section
has been in force for many years and up to 1915 at least has afforded the sole remedy for the death of all classes of individuals.'
"State v. Diamond, (N. It. :92i) = Pac. 9K8, 993; State v. Gibson,
(Ia. 1919) 174 N. W. 34; Schwartz v. People, (1909),46 Colo. 29, ,244,
1o4 V1ac. 9i; and Commonwealth v. Hans, (i:o7) :95 Mass. 262, 81 N.

E.

14g, ziL. R. A. (N.S.) 7g9, 1i Ann. Cas. 514, 122 A. S. IL 25t. See contra, People v. Raport, (ig2o) 183 N. Y. S. sfg 592, two judges dissenting.
"Ex parte Smith, (O16) 135 Mo. 223, 29, 36 6. W. 628, 33 L. R. A.
606, . A. S. R. 576..
"State v. Finley, (1915) 187 Ito. App. 72, 172 S. W. 162.
"State Board of Medical Examiners v. Lewis, (i92o) 149 Ga. 716,
102 S. E. 24.
"State v. Hennessy, (z9 x) 334 Wash. 351, 195 Pac. 211; State v.
Chavez, (1914) i9 N. M. 325, 142 Pac. 922.
VSpies v. Illinois, (1887) 123 U. S. 13i, :8i, 8 S. C. R. 2aX L. Ed. 8.
'Even death claims paid under the Workmen's Compensation Act -and
passing to the employer by subrogation must be brought under section
8375. Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. St. Paul Gas Light Co., (Minn. May
39, 922). See RcENT CASS, post, p. 593. It seems, however, that the

NOTES

The second, enacted in 1913' and modeled essentially after the Federal Employer's Liability Act,' provides a remedy for the wrongful
death of efhployees on steam railroads; and was apparently enacted
for the purpose of placing railroad employees in intrastate traffic
on the same footing as employees in interstate traffic.
Attention is directed to the lack of harmony existing between
the provisions of the two statutes and the advisability of bringing
about greater uniformity where possible. The more important
differences are here set forth in parallel columns:
Laws of 1915, Chap. 187
Section 8175
1 Provides a new cause of I A survival statute.
2 Unlimited recovery.
action.
3 Damages for the pain and
$7500.
2 Maximum recovery,
suffering of the deceased, as
3 Damages for pecuniary loss
well a! for pecuniary loss.
only.
4 Action by personal repre- 4 Action by surviving spouse
or next of kin.
sentative.
In the first place, since the law has been long settled in Minnesota that section 8175 creates a new cause of action' and is not a
survival statute, it seems an unnecessary complication to introduce a survival statute calling for new decisions on cases whose
fundamental facts are no different from those in cases under section 8175. The conflict of opinion as to the effect of instantaneous
death tinder a survival statute is one example of the'problems that
right of the employee's dependents to recover compensation from the
employer is a new and distinct right of action created by the death. State
ex' I'. Carlison . District Court, (1915) 131 Minn. 96, 154 N. W. 66t.
'Minn. Laws 1915, Chap. 187.
Seamer v.G. N. Ry. Co., (i929) 142 M[inn, 376, 38o, 172 N. WV.
765. 'See
40f course it is to the advantage of the beneficiaries of a deceased
railroad employee to sue under the 1915 act because the defenses of assumption of risk, contributory negligence and the fellow-servant rule are
therein abolished. The Minnesota supreme court has not yet decided
whether this act furnishes the exclusive remedy for the wrongful death of

railroad employees, i,e., whetter section 8z75 is abolished in such er es.
There is no express language in the new statute compelling such a .onelusion, although such an inference may perhaps be'drawn from its later
enactment. Whether or not the new statute is exclusive becomes important only when an action has been inadvertently brought under section 8175.
In Weireter v, G. N. Ry. Co., (192o) 146 Minn.350, 178 N. W. 887, the
action seems to have been brought under section 8t75.
Minn. 42, 50%9g N. W. 357; Clay v.
'Anderson v. Fielding, (9o4) 92 M
Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., (9o8) io4 Minn. 1, 14, iuS N. W. 949. In Fidelity and Casualty Co. iv. St. Paul Gas Light Co., (Minn; May 1g, 922) section 8175 is referred to as a "survival statute," but in view of the decisions

cited this seems an inadvertence.
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would be presented. In the second place, since sectiof 8175 fixes
the maximum recovery at $7500, there seems no reason why the
beneficiaries of deceased railroad employees should be allowed
greater redress, especially in view of the fact that prior to the 1915
act, $7500 was also the maximum recovery for railroad employees.
Thirdly, as to the items of damage recoverable, under section 8175
the damages are for pecuniary loss alone and do not include the
pain and suffering of the deceased: What damages are recoverable under the 1915 act does not seem to have been determined, but
under the Federal Employer's Liability Act, upon which the new
statute is based, a recovery is permitted under the survival feature
for the pain and suffering of the deceased.' The law on the subject of damages might well be harmonized in both death actions."
A final disparity exists in the provisions as to the proper party to
sue, section 8175 confining the action to the personal representative
while the 1915 act provides for suit by the surviving spouse and
erxt of kin."
A question affecting section 8175, and also the 1915 statute if
uniformity is desired, is the limitation period within which the action may be brought. Under section 8175 " The action may be
commenced within two years after the act or omission." Consequently if the injured person does not die until two years after the
injury, the action for wrongful death does not lie: in other words,
the action of the personal representative may be barred before it
ever accrues. Such a result appears illogical and, where proximate
causation can be shown, unjust. It would seem that the statute
of limitations should run only from the time when the action for
death arises, i. e., the time of death, and not from the time of the
'Capital Trust Co. v. G. N. Ry. Co., (1914) I2 Minn. 144, 148, 149
N. W. 14.
179 N. W. 564.t
.GuhIl v. Warroad, etc, Co., (3920) 147 Minun.
'St. Louis, etc., By. Co. v. Craft, (1915) 237 UltS. 648, 658, 35 . C.

R. 7#h,5 L Ed. n6o.

'h can be accomplished by eliminating the survival feature and
substituting for it the new-cause-of-action theory of section 8175. Before

the survival feature was introduced in the federal act, 1he Supreme Court
of the United States confined recovery to pecuniary loss alone. St. Louis,
v. Craft, (x915) *7 U. S. 648, 6S7, as S C. . 704,59 I.- Ed.
etc.,
11" y. Co. 1)

"ln Molstad v. Minneapolis, etc, R. Co., (:9:9) 143 Minn. 26o, 173
N. W. 563, and Brown v.. Duluth, etc., By. Co., (19o) 147 Min. 167, 179
N. W. zoo3, the action seems to have been brought under the 1915 act by
the administrator. It should be noted that the federal act forming the
model for the 1915 act allows suit to be brought by the personal representative. U. S. Comp. Stat. 1918, sec. 8657.

NOTES

injury.' 'If the limitation in section 8175 is changed so as to run
from the time of death, a similar provision should be inserted in the
1915 statute."
The statutes under discussion can he hanonized by legislation.
The 1915 statute can be amended by incorporating in it the cardinal
provisions of section 8175, at the -ame time expressly excluding
from section 8175 actions against railroad companies for the death
of railroad employees. Or section 8175 can be made the exclusive remedy for the wrongful death of any individual, amending the 1915 act by striking out the inconsistent parts and preserving only the advantages derived from the abolition of the commonlaw defenses. Whic)' .nethod to adopt is a matter of legislative
iolicy,
RECENT CASES
ArTO=NEY Axeu CUiE.N-ETrns-WiTNEsses-A maNsv Tasurvi
IN CuENT's CAusz.-An attorney, in the active coinluct of the trial, of-

fered to testify generally as a witness in his client's behalf. The trial
court refused to permit him so to testify unless he withdrew from. the
case as counsel. The attorney declined to accept this alternative and conducted the case to its conclusion. Held, that the decision of the trial court
did not constitute reversible error in the absence of a showing that an offer of proof had be made. Cox v. Kee, (Neb. 1922) x86 N. W. 974.
At the early common law an attorney undoubtedly was disqualified
as a witness for his client under the rule which rendered all parties primarily interested in the outcome of the action incompetent to testify, a
rule of evidence which has been entirely eradicated except in so far as
statutory provisions disqualified interested parties. Jones, Evidence, 2nd
Ed., sec. 712; 28 R.C. L. 469 Under statutory provisions of that nature
it is generally held that the client's attorney is not disqualified merely because of the fact that he receives a fee from the client. Queries v.
Waldron, (1852) 2o Ala. 217; note, 49 L. R. A. (N.S.) 426. But where

"The proviso of section 8175 for the substitution of the personal rep-

resentative in an action brought by the injured person but not prosecuted
to judgment before his death, provides a remedy in all cases whet e the deceased started suit in his lifetime. But a personal injury action may lie
brought in Minnesota within six years, G. S. Minn. 1913, sec. 7701, yet
where the deceased defers his right to sue and then dies more than two
years after the injury, the action is barred under the present statute. This
limitation period was apparently taken from a sursval statute in which,
from the very nature of the action, the limitation began to run from the
date of the injury. A further reason may be the desire of the legislature
to avoid speculation concerning the proximate cause of death.
uA discrepancy also exists between the limitation period under the
1915 act and G. S..if inn. 2913, section 7701. Under the later statute a
railroad employee has but two years to sue for personal injuries, whereas
under section 7701 a personal injury action may be brougljt within six
years.

